“Agreements” and Mergers: The Scope of Federal Maritime Commission Jurisdiction, American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d. 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1975 
Issue 1 Symposium: Legal Services to the Poor in Developing Countries 
January 1975 
“Agreements” and Mergers: The Scope of Federal Maritime 
Commission Jurisdiction, American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 
F.2d. 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the Law of the Sea Commons 
Recommended Citation 
“Agreements” and Mergers: The Scope of Federal Maritime Commission Jurisdiction, American Mail Line, 
Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d. 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 182 (1975). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/13 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTS
"AGREEMENTS" AND MERGERS: THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL MARITIME
COMMISSION JURISDICT1ON
American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d. 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) approved an agreement'
whereby the world's two largest containership operators, Sea-Land Serv-
ice, Inc. and United States Lines, Inc.2 (USL), would have become sub-
1. The Commission's authority over agreements among or between shippers is
founded in § 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970), which provides
in part:
Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, shall
file immediately with the Commission a true copy, or, if oral, a true and com-
plete memorandum, of every agreement with another such carrier or other per-
son subject to this chapter, or modification or cancellation thereof, to which
it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating transpor-
tation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other
special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroy-
ing competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic, allotting
ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings
between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of
freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an
exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The term "agree-
ment' in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrange-
ments.
The Commission shall by order, after notice and hearing, disapprove, cancel
or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether
or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or
unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between
exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate
to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to
the public interest, or to be in violation of this chapter, and shall approve all
other agreements, modifications or cancellations ....
Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section, or
permitted under section 813a of this title, shall be excepted from the provisions
of sections 1 to 11 and 15 of Title 15 [Sherman Act], and amendments and
Acts supplementary thereto.
2. In 1969 Sea-Land Service, Inc., which is owned by McLean Industries, Inc.,
which in turn is owned by RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Reynolds), a subsidiary of RJ.
Reynolds, Inc., and United States Lines, Inc. (USL), a subsidiary of Walter Kidde &
Co., Inc., agreed to a twenty-year charter of USL's entire containership fleet to Sea-
Land, with an option to purchase at the end of the charter period. In November 1970,
the agreement was restructured into a charter-merger agreement, the result of which
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sidiaries of the same corporate parent (Reynolds). The FMC annexed
to the agreement certain conditions' in order to insure competition be-
tween the two carriers and ongoing supervision by the FMC. Peti-
tioners4 sought review5 of the approved agreement, alleging that section
15 of the Shipping Act of 1916 (Act) did not grant the FMC jurisdic-
tion over the agreement because it was a merger.6 The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the order and held:
The agreement, as approved, was a merger over which the FMC had
would have made USL a wholly-owned subsidiary of Reynolds. In December 1970, the
Department of Justice brought an action against Reynolds seeking to enjoin the merger
for violation of the antitrust laws. See note 17 infra.
3. See App. at 171-73, American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Brief for Respondent FMC at 12, American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, supra.
Condition I provided that Reynolds should not sell, dispose of, or otherwise encumber
USL's stock or assets without FMC approval. Condition II provided that Reynolds
should assume all of USL's outstanding debts and assist in future financing. Condition
III provided that Sea-Land and USL should be operated independently and in competi-
tion with each other. Condition IV allowed for continuing FMC supervision, and Con-
ditions V and VI provided for certain procedural matters concerning the merger. Condi-
tion VII dealt with registration of ships that Sea-Land had ordered.
4. Petitioners included three carriers competing with the two principal shipping
lines involved, the United States (represented by the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice), and a labor union. Walter Kidde & Co., the corporate parent of USL,
was also a petitioner, seeking review of the Commission's adverse decision on the supple-
mental agreement, an issue which will not be discussed in this Comment. The supple-
ental agreement provided that if the transaction were disapproved by a federal agency,
Reynolds would find a substitute purchaser. 503 F.2d at 161, 171 n.29.
5. Jurisdiction to review a final order of the FMC is conferred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(3) (1970), and venue by 28 U.S.C. § 2343 (1970).
6. See Brief for Petitioner American Export Lines, Inc. at 24-25, 27-40, American
Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The other allegations were
that the agreement was not between carriers subject to the Shipping Act, that petitioner
American Export Lines was denied a fair hearing, and that the agreement lacked a basis
in law. Id. at 24-25, 40-63.
For a discussion of the definition of "merger," see Note, The Shipping Industry Seeks
a Safe Haven: Merger Jurisdiction for the FMC?, 5 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 274, 274
n.1 (1973), quoting P. AREEDA, ANTIRusT ANALYsIS: PROBLEMS, TEx-r, CASES 510
(1967):
Antitrust analysis customarily uses the word "merger" to describe a more or
less permanent union of previously separate enterprises. It is generally irrele-
vant whether either or both corporations survive as a matter of corporate law.
• . . Apart from the few instances requiring greater precision, we may gener-
ally speak interchangeably of mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, amalgama-
tions or other forms of union. Such unions replace independent decision-mak-
ing institutions with a unified system of control (whether or not actually ex-
ercised).
As used in this Comment, unless the context otherwise requires, "merger" should be
taken to include all these terms.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/13
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no jurisdiction, notwithstanding the conditions imposed by the Commis-
sion.
Congress has expressly granted some federal agencies jurisdiction over
mergers involving companies subject to the particular agency's regula-
tion.' Approval of such mergers does not in all cases exempt the merger
from operation of the antitrust laws.0 Section 15 of the Shipping Act,
however, which grants the FMC authority over agreements between
shippers and insulates those agreements from the antitrust laws, does
not specify whether the FMC has jurisdiction over mergers. 10
The Shipping Act of 1916 was enacted to substitute "effective gov-
ernment control" for "the disadvantages and abuses connected with
steamship agreements and conferences as [then] conducted . ... 1
7. American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95
S. Ct. 656 (1974).
8. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970) (FDIC); 47 id. § 222(b)(1) (FCC juris-
diction over telephone and telegraph mergers); 49 id. § 5(2) (ICC); id. § 1378(a)
(CAB).
9. See, e.g., 12 id. § 1828(c) (approval of bank merger does not produce exemp-
tion).
10. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970). Neither legislative, judicial, nor administrative history
supports an inference that Congress intended to grant such authority to the FMC. See
note 16 infra. A contrary argument is made in Brief for Respondent FMC at 21, Amer-
ican Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and in 40 Gno. WAsH. L.
Rav. 322 (1971), commenting on United States v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 325
F. Supp. 656 (D.NJ. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 964 (1973). Both respondent FMC
and the student commentator suggest that the legislative history of § 15 can be read
to include jurisdiction over mergers because the term "arrangements" as used in the
Committee Report's discussion of domestic shipping problems included mergers and
asset acquisitions. No documented support is given for this suggestion. Respondent
FMC and the student commentator both look to later congressional silence on Commis-
sion assertions of jurisdiction as support for the Commission's position. For a discus-
sion of the opposite viewpoint, see note 16 infra.
11. HousE COMM. ON TIM MERCHANT MARINE AND FisHmuEs, REPORT ON STAiM-
sHIP AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADE,
H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1914) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER
REPORT]. "[Effective government control] is the means of preserving to American ex-
porters and importers the advantages enumerated and of preventing the abuses com-
plained of." Id. These advantages included improvement of service, stability and uni-
formity of rates, more economic cost distribution, and maintenance of parity with for-
eign shippers. Id. at 295-303. Some of the abuses were the monopolistic nature of con-
ferences, arbitrary rate increases made without notice, secrecy of the conferences and
agreements, special rates and deferred rebates to large shippers, and the lack of publica-
tion of tariff schedules. Id. at 304-07.
"Agreements" mentioned in text were one of three methods described in the Alexander
Report by which a steamship line could control its competition. The other two methods
were "control through acquisition of water lines or ownership of accessories to the lines"
and "control through special practices." Id. at 409 (emphasis added).Washington University Open Scholarship
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Section 15 of the Act 12 provides the standards by which the Commis-
sion determines the necessity of, and benefit from, specific agree-
ments."5 Although there have been many cases concerning the Com-
mission's authority to approve certain kinds of agreements, 4 in only
three instances-FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,'5 Matson Navigation Co.
12. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970), quoted in part in note 1 supra.
13. Section 15 provides for the disapproval of agreements that are unjustly discrimi-
natory, detrimental to commerce, contrary to the public interest, or violative of a speci-
fic provision of the Act. The "public interest" standard was added by amendment in
1961 to broaden the Commission's authority to disapprove agreements. FMC v. Aktie-
bolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 243 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261 (1968)
(FMC jurisdiction over agreement concerning fund for Longshoremen's Union); FMC
v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerilka Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968) (FMC disapproved tying
rule and unanimity rule of shipping conference); Transamerican Trailer Transp. v.
FMC, 492 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FMC approved cost allocation agreement be-
tween New York Shipping Association and Longshoremen's Association).
15. 460 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 726 (1973). Seatrain contains
a fairly comprehensive look at the legislative, judicial, and administrative history of § 15
and concludes that a one-time acquisition of assets is not the kind of agreement speci-
fied in the section. Looking beyond the first paragraph of § 15, the court stated that
the second and third paragraphs "undeniably envision agreements which are amenable to
continuing Commission supervision." Id. at 935. Furthermore, in construing the
Alexander Report the court noted that the House Committee had distinguished between
"transactions not of a continuing nature" and agreements, thus undercutting the FMC's
contention that the Committee had "used the term 'agreement' to encompass transactions
other than those constituting cooperative working agreements." Id. at 939, citing ALrx-
AmER REPORT 409. See note 10 supra. The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a
manimous opinion which held that agreements within FMC jurisdiction must be of a
continuing and ongoing nature.
The court of appeals also rejected the Commission's contention that congressional ac-
tion subsequent to the Shipping Act augmented the Commission's authority. 460 F.2d
at 941-43. The FMC claimed that merger jurisdiction had been vested in the Commis-
sion by the language of the 1950 amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act to provide that
nothing in that section applies to "transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority
given by the . .. United States [now Federal] Maritime Commission . .. under any
statutory provision vesting such power in such Commission," Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch.
1184, 64 Stat. 1125, amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1970)). The court noted, however, that the Senate Report stated that "' it is not in-
tended that the Maritime Commission ...shall be granted any authority or powers
which it does not already possess."' 460 F.2d at 941 (emphasis supplied by the court),
quoting S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950).
For other examples of an unsuccessful claim of augmented authority under this
amendment, see California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485-88 (1962) (two gas companies
merged and sought antitrust exemption on basis of FPC approval); Maryland and Vir-
ginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 469-70 (1959) (Association
claimed that Secretary of Agriculture approval of acquisition produced antitrust exemp-
tion).
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v. FMC,16 and United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,17-have
courts considered the Commission's role in attempted mergers. In
Matson the Ninth Circuit held that the Commission had jurisdiction
over merger agreements,' 8 but the Supreme Court subsequently held
in Seatrain'a that section 15 did not confer merger jurisdiction. The
Court stated that "the statute . . envisions a continuing supervisory
role for the Commission and invests it with power to disallow an agree-
ment after a period of time,"20 but concluded that a one-time merger
or acquisition of assets does not meet the statutory criterion.
The FMC contended in American Mail Line Ltd. v. FMC21 that
the conditions annexed to the merger agreement gave the FMC the
continuing supervisory role contemplated by the statute.2 2  The court
found, however, that "the merger is a substantial and principal feature
of the transaction," 2 that "the merger portion of the agreement is not
16. 405 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1968). Matson involved an appeal of a Commission
order approving a merger of three lines. Matson sought to have the order vacated,
claiming, inter alia, that the FMC had no authority to approve mergers. The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, citing language in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390
U.S. 261, 276 (1968), which stated that Congress in enacting § 15 meant to "'subject
to the scrutiny of a specialized government agency the myriad of restrictive agreements
in the maritime industry."' 405 F.2d at 800. Although it recognized that Volkswagen-
werk did not deal with a merger, the court felt that the expansive language in the opin-
ion and the nature and consequences of shipping industry mergers required that such
agreements to merge be subject to "expert scrutiny." The court therefore concluded that
section 15 grants merger jurisdiction to the FMC. Id.
17. 325 F. Supp. 656 (D.N.J. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 964 (1973). Reynolds
involved the same parties as the principal case. In Reynolds, the Department of Jus-
tice, alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18 (1970), sought to enjoin the implementa-
tion of the original charter-merger agreement, and the FMC petitioned to intervene and
have the action stayed or dismissed until the proceedings on the agreement before the
Commission were completed. Judge Garth explored the legislative history of the Ship-
ping Act and determined that while Congress did not deliberately intend to except mer-
ger agreements from FMC authority, it did intend to give the Commission supervisory
powers over only those agreements having an "ongoing nature." He concluded that the
merger of USL into RJI, Corp., a corporation created to effect the merger, was not of
an "ongoing nature" and that the FMC had no authority to approve or disapprove it.
The court therefore refused to stay or dismiss the Justice Department suit. 325 F. Supp.
at 658-63; see note 2 supra.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. 411 U.S. 726 (1973); see note 15 supra.
20. 411 U.S. at 735. "But it is hard to see how the Commission can exercise this
supervisory function when there are no continuing obligations to supervise." Id.
21. 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 656 (1974).
22. Brief for Respondent FMC at 24, American Mail Line Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d
157 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see note 3 supra.
23. 503 F.2d at 167.
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within the Commission's jurisdiction under the present provisions of
section 15,"'24 and that "the Commission cannot acquire jurisdiction
merely by agreement of the parties before it."2 5  The court stated that
agreements subject to section 15 must (1) create ongoing rights and
responsibilities requiring FMC supervision, (2) retain the separate iden-
tity, ownership and independence of the parties, and (3) be "between
parties subject to the Act." 6 Although the court found the first attribute
present, it found the second lacking and, consequently, did not pass on
the third. 27 In American Mail Lines, therefore, the District of Columbia
Circuit followed and expanded the Supreme Court's holding in Seatrain
by finding that a merger, even when coupled with conditions creating
ongoing supervisory duties for the FMC and requiring the merging com-
panies to compete and function independently, did not trigger section 15
jurisdiction.28
24. Id. "Whether it is desirable for Congress to vest such jurisdiction in the Com-
mission is not for us to determine." Id. (footnote omitted).
25. 503 F.2d at 170. The inference that Reynolds volunteered to submit itself to
the jurisdiction of the FMC arises from Reynolds' proposal of the conditions of ongoing
supervision which the Commission ultimately adopted. Id. at 161-62. The Commission,
of course, argued that it could assert its statutory jurisdiction since the agreement with
its ongoing conditions was of the kind encompassed by § 15 of the Act and the relevant
precedent. See Brief for Respondent FMC at 21-26, American Mail Lines, Ltd. v. FMC,
503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
26. 503 F.2d at 165-66. The first attribute is self-explanatory. The second is de-
rived from Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 460 F.2d 932, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1972), citing
United States v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 325 F. Supp. 656, 658-59 (D.NJ. 1971). The
third feature follows from the statutory requirement of filing of agreements by "every
ommon carrier by water or other person subject to this chapter." 46 U.S.C. § 814
(1970). These attributes clearly are not exclusive. See 503 F.2d at 166 n.15.
27. Since the FMC approved the agreement with conditions requiring continuing
FMC supervision, the first attribute is present. 503 F.2d at 168. The court assumed
the existence of the third attribute without actually deciding. Id. at 169 n.22. The sec-
ond attribute is not present because USL would have become a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Reynolds. The court found this to be dispositive. Id. at 169-70.
The question arises whether a long-term lease agreement which contains the character-
istics stated in American Mail Line would be subject to § 15 of the Act. A logical
analysis of the court's decision leads to the conclusion that substance would rule over
form and a court would find that other attributes of § 15 jurisdiction were not met by
the hypothetical lease. A long-term lease, for example, wherein the lessee holds all in-
dicia of ownership except title, would probably be disapproved by the court. See also
United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 181-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
cited in 503 F.2d at 170-71 n.27.
The requirement that the agreement be between parties subject to the Act raises an-
other unanswered question. Reynolds does not fit into the statutory definition of either
a "common carrier by water" or "other person subject to this chapter" although it is
the owner of Sea-Land. See 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
28. 503 F.2d at 171.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/13
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The court demonstrated that the FMC did not impose any obligations
on the parties that did not exist under the statutory scheme. 2  The
court also concluded that the conditions did not prevent Reynolds' com-
plete control over USL, even though Reynolds could not "sell, dispose
of or encumber USL's stock or assets without Commission approval."8 0
Furthermore, the contention that the conditions insured competition by
continuing FMC supervision was dismissed on the ground that compe-
tition is required by both the Shipping Act and the antitrust laws.8 1 The
other conditions were perfunctorily rejected as not being "cooperative
working agreements with another carrier or person subject to the Act"
since they were imposed only on Reynolds.82  In addition, the court re-
jected as circular the FMC claim that since it had jurisdiction over the
original charter-merger agreement,8 3 it retained jurisdiction over the
agreement after the modification. 4
Had -the court concluded that the Commission did have jurisdiction
over the merger, the agreement would have been insulated from the
29. Id. at 170. The reasoning of the court is circular. If the FMC had the jurisdic-
tion it asserted, then the Commission did have the continuing supervisory role contem-
plated by the statute and the conditions were superfluous. If the FMC did not have
merger jurisdiction, then the statutory authority in the Commission to supervise the on-
going aspects was nugatory since the Commission's jurisdiction cannot be expanded by
agreement.
30. 503 F.2d at 167. The court continued:
However, the proposed conditions themselves suggest that Reynolds would pos-
sess virtually unlimited ownership and control over USL. ... It is unlikely
that Reynolds would undertake such responsibilities [e.g., assuming all debts,
expenses, and financing] if it did not consider itself possessed of essentially
complete ownership of USL.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
31. Id. at 169; see Condition III, set out in App. at 172, American Mail Line Ltd.
v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Dictum in Seatrain indicated that an acqui-
sition of assets coupled with an agreement not to compete might be within Commission
jurisdiction. 460 F.2d at 943-46. The court in American Mail Line, however, stated
that
[r]egardless of the Commission's jurisdiction over agreements not to compete,
it does not follow that section 15 confers jurisdiction over the undertaking to
compete in this case. An agreement not to compete is precisely the type of
arrangement which Congress intended to regulate by section 15.
503 F.2d at 169 (emphasis original).
32. Id. at 170.
33. See note 2 supra.
34. The difficulty with this argument is that it would allow the Commission
to take jurisdiction over one agreement, transform the agreement into an out-
right merger and then approve the outright merger. This circuitous procedure
would enable the Commission to escape the Supreme Court's holding in Sea-
train that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over outright mergers.
Id. at 171. See also California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 490 (1962).Washington University Open Scholarship
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antitrust laws.35 Where Congress has explicitly granted an agency the
authority to exempt certain approved agreements from the antitrust
laws, courts are not likely to allow the agency to extend its jurisdiction
to other forms of agreement.3 6 Since section 15 did not specifically
grant merger jurisdiction to the FMC,37 the court looked to the legisla-
tive history 3 and the antitrust laws to determine that the FMC was
asserting jurisdiction it did not possess.
The Supreme Court in Seatrain observed that statues creating ex-
emptions from the antitrust laws must be strictly construed. 9 The
Court had stated earlier that "[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implica-
tion from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only
been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and
regulatory provisions."40 In addition, the District of Columbia Circuit
has reasoned that antitrust policies have assumed such significance in
the statutory scheme and economic functioning of the country that a
finding of congressional intent to grant limited exemptions from the
antitrust laws is not readily implied. 41 Consequently, it is unlikely that
Congress would have exempted mergers without indicating that they
were included in the term "agreement." 42  The strict construction of
exemption statutes called for by United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc.,43 the importance of the antitrust laws,4 4 and the means that could
35. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
36. See Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, 409 U.S. 363, 402 (1973) (Burger, CJ., dissent-
ing).
37. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
39. 411 U.S. at 733; see United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305,
316 (1956) (large drug manufacturer entered into illegal agreements not exempted from
Sherman Act § I by the Miller-Tydings Act or the McGuire Act). Although McKesson
does not deal with a problem in a regulated industry, the requirement of strict statutory
construction is germane to the issue in American Mail Line.
40. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1962) (foot-
notes omitted).
41. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (action against
Washington Redskins and District of Columbia Armory Board on restrictive lease agree-
ment).
42. See Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 460 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd,
411 U.S. 726 (1973). The Court in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366, 374 (1973) stated:
When. . .relationships are governed in the first instance by business judgment
and not regulatory coercion, courts must be hesitant to conclude that Congress
intended to override the fundamental national policies embodied in the anti-
trust laws.
43. 351 U.S. 305 (1956), see note 39 supra.
44. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1965):
189
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be used to gain exemption from these laws4" force the conclusion that
section 15 was not intended to confer merger jurisdiction upon the
FMC.46
Either a court decision overruling Seatrain or congressional action
amending section 15 would be necessary to grant the FMC jurisdiction
over mergers. Even then "the FMC would be bound to weigh the wel-
fare of the shipping industry against the purported anticompetitive ef-
fects of the merger."47 Without a change in the law, the FMC will
only be able "to intervene on behalf of the 'industry viewpoint' "48 in
any antitrust action attacking a shipping industry merger. It has been
suggested that few shipping industry mergers "will survive scrutiny by
the courts in antitrust proceedings brought by the Justice Depart-
ment." '9 By holding that section 15 does not grant merger jurisdiction
to the FMC, the courts 0 have effectively prevented the expansion of
the Commission's jurisdiction and limited the role of the FMC in the
process of balancing the needs and policies of the regulatory scheme
with the policies behind the antitrust laws. Unless the Commission can
clearly demonstrate that merger jurisdiction is necessary for its regula-
tion of the shipping industry, Congress should follow the courts'
holdings and not change the statute.
"We have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental national eco-
nomic policy ....
45. 503 F.2d at 164. "Otherwise an outright merger or sale of assets could be struc-
tured to include some ongoing aspect for the sole purpose of obtaining antitrust shelter
under § 15." Id.
46. One commentator has stated that
[a] frequent complaint of scholars has been that a regulatory agency tends to
adopt the viewpoint of the industry and regulation becomes lax. This criticism
has particular applicability to the shipping industry in view of the history of
desultory regulation.
Comment, Accommodation of Antitrust Law and Ocean Shipping Regulation, 4 TEXAS
INT'L LJ. 393, 424 (1968) (footnote omitted), citing Loevinger, Regulation and Compe-
tition as Alternatives, 11 ANTRUST BuLL. 101, 131 (1966); Note, Regulated Industries
and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 COLUM. L. REv.
673, 697 (1958). This viewpoint clearly supports the conclusion reached by the courts.
But see FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 253 (1968) (Har-
lan, J., concurring); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust
Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 46 (1962).
47. Note, supra note 6, at 288.
48. Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 460 F.2d 932, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
49. Note, supra note 6, at 291.
50. FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973), aff'g 460 F.2d 932 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 656 (1974); United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 325 F. Supp. 656
(D.N.J. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 964 (1973). Contra, Matson Navigation Co. v.
FMC, 405 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 1975:182
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